AgentLedger
io.github.entradox/agent-ledgerVersion 0.4.7Meter, cap, and block AI agent spend before the provider is charged.
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Connect
Streamable HTTP
https://aiagentscity.com/mcp/Responds241 msNo sign-in
Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http agent-ledger https://aiagentscity.com/mcp/Claude Desktop and claude.ai
Settings > Connectors > Add custom connector
Name: agent-ledger
Remote MCP server URL: https://aiagentscity.com/mcp/Cursor
{
"mcpServers": {
"agent-ledger": {
"url": "https://aiagentscity.com/mcp/"
}
}
}VS Code
code --add-mcp '{"name":"agent-ledger","type":"http","url":"https://aiagentscity.com/mcp/"}'Built your own server? run.zero hosts MCP servers on European infrastructure.
Tools
18 tools
Read-only | Idempotent | Open world | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
ledger_alertsAlert history for an agent: budget warnings (80% threshold) and spending spikes.
Requires a credential: either the agent's own agent_secret or its
workspace's workspace_key (same rule as GET /v1/alerts). | No | Yes | Yes | Not declared |
ledger_api_docsSelf-serve documentation for AgentLedger — quickstart, MCP tools, REST
endpoints, budget caps, error codes, and idempotency usage, as markdown. | No | Yes | Yes | Not declared |
ledger_approval_decideApprove or deny a pending spend permit — workspace owner only.
The agent's own agent_secret can REQUEST an approval but can never decide
one: a credential that can approve its own requests is not a control.
decision must be 'approve' or 'deny'; only pending permits can be decided.
An approved permit is consumed by the agent's next ledger_track within
its amount — it is a one-shot exception, not a raised cap. | Yes | No | Yes | Not declared |
ledger_approvalsList spend-approval permits — yours, or your whole workspace's. | No | Yes | Yes | Not declared |
ledger_check_spendAsk BEFORE you spend: may this agent spend this much right now?
Returns allowed (true/false), a stable reason code (within_budget,
over_monthly_cap, over_daily_cap, over_monthly_token_cap,
over_daily_token_cap, no_budget_set, unpriced_model), a one-line message,
the cost estimate, the price used (with its source and as_of date) and
every budget window with cap, spent and remaining.
Same decision the /proxy/{provider} gate enforces. Read-only: nothing is
recorded or reserved, so record the spend with ledger_track afterwards.
Give exactly one spend shape: amount_cents (any rail, e.g. an x402
purchase), OR model with tokens_in/tokens_out. | No | Yes | Yes | Not declared |
ledger_examplesComplete, runnable Python recipe for a common AgentLedger integration
pattern. | No | Yes | Yes | Not declared |
ledger_priceWhat will this call cost? Priced from the same table the caps use.
Exists because ledger_track requires the CALLER to supply amount_cents, so an
agent whose spend is capped could under-report its own cost and stay under
the cap. This returns the number the enforcement path would use, so an agent
can report honestly (and plan before it spends).
Cost = (tokens_in * in_rate + tokens_out * out_rate) / 1_000_000. If the
model has cache rates, the standard in-rate is used, which is the
conservative direction for a spend cap.
Every price carries the source it came from and the date it was read, and
`verified: false` means the number was NOT read off the provider's own
pricing page. Treat an unverified price as an estimate, not a measurement. | No | Yes | Yes | Not declared |
ledger_proxy_attachPoint your provider traffic at the proxy so budget caps are enforced
BEFORE the provider is contacted, instead of being reported afterwards.
This closes the gap where the brake was unreachable from MCP: an agent
connected over MCP could record spend (ledger_track) but nothing could
refuse a call. With this, the cap is enforced on every LLM call.
Returns the base_url to use, the two headers to send, and the exact change
for the OpenAI and Anthropic SDKs. Your provider credential is NOT part of
this: it stays in Authorization / x-api-key and is only forwarded, never
stored. | No | Yes | Yes | Not declared |
ledger_reportSpend report for an agent over a rolling window.
Returns total spend, breakdown by rail and by service, budget status
(ok/warning/exceeded), detected anomalies, and entry count.
Requires a credential: either the agent's own agent_secret or its
workspace's workspace_key (same rule as GET /v1/report). | No | Yes | Yes | Not declared |
ledger_request_approvalAsk your workspace owner for a one-shot spend exception before a
ledger_track that the cap would refuse.
Creates a pending permit for exactly amount_cents on the given service.
The owner (a human, or a supervisor agent holding the workspace_key)
approves or denies it with ledger_approval_decide. An APPROVED permit is
consumed by the next ledger_track for this agent whose amount fits inside
it — the budget cap itself does not change. Permits expire after 1 hour
undecided. Poll with ledger_approvals to see the decision.
Claiming a brand-new agent_id requires workspace_key; otherwise pass the
agent's agent_secret. | No | No | No | Not declared |
ledger_revoke_secretInvalidate an agent_id's agent_secret WITHOUT deleting its spend history.
Use when a credential may have leaked, or to stop an agent writing.
Subsequent writes to that agent fail with agent_secret_mismatch until you
rotate a new secret in. The agent_id stays claimed, so no other workspace
can claim it and inherit the ledger. Requires the workspace_key that owns
agent_id.
Returns {"agent_id", "revoked": True, "_note"}, or {"error", "error_code"}. | Yes | No | No | Not declared |
ledger_rotate_secretMint a NEW agent_secret for an agent_id your workspace already owns, invalidating the old one.
Use this to RECOVER an agent whose secret was lost: the previous credential
stops working immediately. Requires the workspace_key that owns agent_id —
an agent's own agent_secret cannot rotate itself, because a leaked agent
credential must not be able to lock its real owner out. Unlike ledger_track
this never claims a new agent_id: an unknown id returns agent_not_claimed.
The new secret is returned ONCE. Store it before you drop the response.
Returns {"agent_id", "agent_secret", "_note"}, or {"error", "error_code"}. | Yes | No | No | Not declared |
ledger_set_budgetSet spending caps for an agent. Warns at 80%, blocks spend when exceeded
— enforced: a ledger_track call that would cross the cap is rejected.
Dollar caps (monthly_cents/daily_cents) and token caps (monthly_tokens/
daily_tokens) are independent dimensions: dollar caps only cover
non-"tokens" rails, token caps only cover rail="tokens" bookkeeping rows
(tokens_in/tokens_out). Set both if the agent uses both.
Monthly cap is required; the rest are optional (0 = no limit).
Overwrites any existing budget for the agent — with one rule: raising
or removing an existing cap requires the workspace_key. An agent_secret
can tighten its own caps but never loosen them; to grow an allowance
the agent asks its owner (see ledger_request_approval). Claiming a
brand-new agent_id requires your workspace_key; that first call mints an
agent_secret (returned once — save it); later calls for that agent_id
must pass the agent_secret back (no workspace_key needed again). | Yes | No | Yes | Not declared |
ledger_startGet a FREE AgentLedger workspace with no credential and no arguments —
the MCP equivalent of opening POST /start in a browser.
Call this FIRST if you have no credentials yet. Every other tool here
(ledger_track, ledger_set_budget, ledger_report, ledger_alerts) needs a
workspace_key or an agent_secret, so a caller arriving with neither must
start here or it has nowhere to go.
Takes NO arguments on purpose: the goal is zero friction. It returns a
`workspace_key` (shown exactly once — it cannot be re-revealed, so store it
before continuing) which you then send as `workspace_key` on your first
ledger_track for a NEW agent_id. That first write returns the agent's own
`agent_secret`, which authenticates every write after it.
The free tier includes every rail, enforced budget caps, alerts, reports and
the MCP server, capped at 3 agents per workspace. Minting is rate-limited
per caller IP, the same limit the human door uses.
Prefer to pay? POST /v1/billing/x402 with a wallet-signed payment needs no
human and buys 24h of Pro (agent allowance per the live pass tier — see
/pricing.md). | No | No | No | No |
ledger_trackRecord a spend entry for an AI agent on any payment rail, with optional token counts.
Claiming a brand-new agent_id requires your workspace_key (get one via
x402 at POST /v1/billing/x402 — no human, no login — or at /start).
That first call mints an
agent_secret and returns it in the response — save it, every later call
for that same agent_id must pass it back (no workspace_key needed again)
or the write is rejected. Amounts are capped
at $100,000/entry and must be >= 0. If a budget is set for this agent,
an entry that would cross the monthly/daily cap is blocked, not just
logged. Caps here bind the AMOUNT YOU REPORT — a caller that lies to
amount_cents lies to the cap. The only enforcement against real spend is
routing the provider call through the /proxy/{provider} rail, which
prices from the provider's own usage block. Include tokens_in/tokens_out + model on every LLM call so token
burn shows up in the /v1/tokens report. | No | No | No | Not declared |
ledger_wait_eventsLong-poll an agent's event feed — how an agent with no public URL receives alerts.
Webhooks (POST /v1/webhooks) push events to a URL you own; an agent on
stdio MCP cannot host one, so it waits here instead. Call this in a loop:
the call holds open up to `timeout` seconds (max 30) and returns when
events arrive or the wait lapses.
`consumer_id` names this consumer durably — pick a stable one
(e.g. "claude-code-main") and reuse it. Each call returns a `cursor`;
pass it back on your next call once you have processed that batch — that
is the ack. To get restart redelivery, also pass `client_instance` (your
process id or any per-boot token) and `client_started` (when your
process booted): when the pair changes, events that were served but
never acked come back with `redelivered: true`, so nothing is lost to a
crash between serve and process. (The stdio MCP server supplies its own
pid/started automatically — hosted callers must opt in because the
gateway cannot see the client's process.)
Each event is an envelope: id (deterministic — dedupe on it), kind
(alert.raised | budget.warning | budget.exceeded | anomaly.detected),
summary, context (agent_id, alert_type, timestamp),
alerts_since_last_write (how many alerts are stacked up since the
agent's last spend write — use it to throttle escalation), redelivered.
Requires a credential: either the agent's own agent_secret or its
workspace's workspace_key (same rule as GET
/v1/agents/{agent_id}/events/wait). | No | Yes | Yes | Not declared |
read_skillRead a product skill file by its skill:// URI. | Not declared | Not declared | Not declared | Not declared |
skills_list_toolList this product's skills. Each entry carries the SKILL.md URI,
its name and description, verbatim frontmatter, and a per-file
sha256 manifest. Read a body with `read_skill`. | Not declared | Not declared | Not declared | Not declared |
Details
- Registry status
- Active
- Published
- Oct 16, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 16, 2026
- Categories (suggested)
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- GDPR
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